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THE IDEA OF LAW AMONG CIVILIZED PEOPLES*
THE GENERAL system of Roman law is dominated by a great
antithesis, which has exercised in the life of the law and in the
theorizing of jurists and philosophers a most powerful influence,
both of good and of bad, namely, the opposition between the
civil law and the natural law, jus civile and jus naturale.
This distinction among the Romans was the fruit of observation and of experience. The good fortune and superior political
organization of the Romans made them able to dominate all
the nations living -on the shores of the Mediterranean and to
unify the ancient world. Barbarous and semi-civilized peoples
of the west and in the countries of the north, and people of
diverse civilization, but all superior to and much more advanced
than their conquerors (the Punic, Greek, Hellenistic, and Oriental
civilizations), were all gathered under the Roman scepter and
constituted such a varied mixture that not even the Anglo-Saxon
Empire of today has its equal. In the laws of all these peoples,
or tribes, the Romans observed a combination of corresponding
institutions which seemed to constitute a common basis, so not
alone in their own laws but in all the laws of the peoples they
distinguished two groups, a complex number of particular precepts and a complex number of common precepts. The jurist
Gaius expresses it in this form:
"omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur."
*Translated by Signorina Yone Galletti Cambiagi, Foreign Offie,
Rome.
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The designation of the common category of rules was sometimes the jus gentium and sometimes the jus naturale. The first
designation belongs wholly to the Romans. It is related to their
observation and expresses their universal recognition. The
Romans inherited the designation of jus naturale from the Greek
philosophy, but they infused into it a more positive spirit. The
essential idea of the words, natura, naturalis, naturaliter, is what
exists, happens or comes to pass independently of man's active
agency, but through the work of other forces and especially
through a general power of movement, nature, and the mysterious force which creates these facts and these effects.
So therefore, to consider some examples taken from these
same Roman jurists, in matters not related to law, we notice
that they say, "naturalis agger,' the barrier not made by man,
or in other words not artificial or manufactured; "motus naturalis
arboris," a natural movement of a tree; the water coming down
from the sky has a natural cause, "naturalis causa": the river, a
"naturalis alveus," etc. In these instances the most general contrast is with everything produced by man, or whatever a man
causes, provokes, or, in fact, makes. Lex naturae or natura
rerum signifies in these instances what the natural sciences call
natural law or nature. Now transported to the field of law, the
word does not express a different thought nor assume a mystical
appearance. The antithesis is above all related to the forms of
legal action which constitute the part most visibly in contrast
between different peoples and in which the mutual relations make
the contrast most noticeable. There are rules in which are seen
the will of the legislator and other rules which correspond exactly
in their scope to the social conscience. The first are the work of
legislators: they have been discussed in the Senate and approved
by the Council; the second represent an ancient and sacred
inheritance, an obscure elaboration whose origin it is not possible
to trace. We can say that natural law has not been established
by civilization, which has not invented it nor shaped it of its own
will, but has discovered it in the social conscience, and by no
other recognition, as a rule of law.
But in this way it is easily understood how we reach the
conclusion that this jus, responding always to duty and conforming always to justice (that is to say, what the Romans called
equitas), has been established not by man but by a Being, above
man, which will be the personification of the same thing-Nature.
Gaius defines the jus naturale or the jus gentium as the law
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"quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit," that is to
say, the law which nature and the natural order of things (and
not natural reason) has established among all mankind.
The prevailing opinion holds that the last of the jurists, as
Ulpian. Trifoninus, and Hermogenian, have made a further distinction between jus naturale and jus gentium. Modern criticism, with which I agree, holds to a contrary opinion. There is
reason to believe that not a single one of the Roman lawyers
(Hermogenian does not belong to the classical Roman school of
jurisprudence) ever made the distinction between jus gentium
and jus naturale. This distinction belongs to the Christian
Emperor Justinian or to the Roman-Christian epoch. Norms
which pertain to the body of natural law have no reason to change
in order to assume a form more adapted to the aim of the norms
of the jus civile. They only change when the social surroundings
are completely transformed and the reason for them disappears,
a thing which man by instinct cannot believe possible. Therefore it is obvious that this law comes to be conceived of as an
eternal law, unchangeable in time as well as in space.
Nevertheless given the positive character of natural law
among the Romans and given the empirical method of establishing the principles of natural law, the idea that this right would
be absolute and unchangeable could not cause any harm to the
Romans. Not so harmless, however, was a similar conception in
modern times, especially in the 18th century just on the eve of
the French Revolution when the philosophers and jurists and the
so-called "natural rights" school, the historians and literary men
approving the doctrine, pretended to fix a priori a natural law
of pure fancy. without taking into consideration the men and
society in which they lived. The naturalis ratio of the Romans,
which was only used to mean the natural order of things, a pure
synonym for Nature, was converted by a curious mistake and
the school of natural law was called by some philosophers the
school of rational law.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century this idea of natural
law, which during so many centuries dominated the ancient and
the modern civilization, was combated by the works of the
German historical school.
In truth, this idea had already been combated since the year
600. But the word pronounced too soon by our Vico in the
full glory of rationalism and under the unfavorable conditions
of Italy was a voice crying out in the wilderness. Even a few
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years before Savigny, the eloquent voice of Burke was heard in
the English Parliament combating the principles of natural law
on which were founded the principles of the French constitution,
but without any immediate result. The historical school raised
in opposition to the school of natural law was based on two
postulates, each of them in opposition to the idea of the school
of natural law, juridical evolution and the national conscience.
There is nothing unchangeable in law, nor may we create a priori
a system of ideal law, because law, as well as morality, habits,
art, is subject to a perpetual evolution, nor can there be a law
common to all people, because each race has its own national
conscience by which the law is inspired. Thus the idea of evolution, which was to renew so many sciences and to create new
ones (if the nineteenth century is the especially scientific century), made its first appearance largely and strongly in the
domain of law, since its applications to comparative philology,
to geology, and to psychology are all later, and even its application to biology is later or at least dates from about the same
time. Vico recalls the seventeenth century; the declaration of
Burke, the end of the eighteenth; as also the celebrated pamphlet
of Savigny, published in 1814, follows closely with greater developments the biological communications of Geoffroy St. Hilaire
and of Lamarck. Before the philosopher of evolution, Herbert
Spencer, began to synthesize the various applications of the
doctrine of evolution, very often in opposition to one another
(it is known how Lyell, and not he alone, remade geology on
the basis of evolution, but was nevertheless one of the strongest
adversaries of biological evolution), the science of law for nearly
half a century had been based on the same ideas.
Nevertheless, the two postulates of the historical school did
not represent in the least all the truth, and together they have
brought, with some good benefits, both aberration and harm.
A notable confusion in the mind has produced the doubtful
expression and hence the epithet "slow and gradual" added to
the concept of evolution. Above all, this epithet, which arose
perhaps as an effect of the age when the concept was born,
transformed it into a political instrument which would necessarily injure its scientific value.
In the writings of Savigny, in the words -of Burke, and in
the works of the historical school the concept was used as a
weapon against the dreams of the French Revolution and even
against the most useful innovations produced by that great event.
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Instead of being an instrument of progress, as it was in the idea
which inspired it, it was used at the beginning as a help to restore
and in course of time also to reinforce the conservative tendencies and to weaken the progressive ideas. This worship of
history and of historical continuity became fetichism. Really the
study of past ages, the sentimental passion, the idyllic coloration
of the different past stages of national life, helped to chain the
mind to the most obsolete institutions. History and romanticism
ran together. The historical justification of everything that exists
nowadays inspired a resistance to any change; anything which
lives has a reason to live. Any innovation was banished as contrary to the slow and gradual evolution, the contribution of men
came to be nearly eliminated, and progress was represented as
a movement of things which, in their course, carried men away
from their voluntary liberty, from their own activity.
But the true scientific harm of that concession was exactly
this: for the sake of the principal, the accessory was forgotten
and the research of organic law was neglected, that is, the development of law as against the slow and gradual charactdr of the
movement which seemed to assume the entire concept of evolution. And this expression in which the common opinion used to
sum up the concept is probably untrue. Latest studies have
contributed to destroy these pretended bases of evolution in the
field of biology, but above all in the field of social sciences it is
observed how peoples pass through periods of slow movement
and sometimes of stagnation, followed by sudden crises in which
everything changes, and, if the institutions of the past are not
abolished, there is injected into them the germs of a profound
alteration and of a great and sudden movement in a wholly new
direction. The classical countries of evolution cannot escape
from this law. The history of Roman law, which in the concept
of the historical school was represented as a slow and gradual
development from the first king of Rome to the great legislator
of Constantinople, may be now considered as a story in which
the conservative forces have suddenly twice undergone the effects
of an immense crisis.
But the other concept which isolates law in the pales of
the national mind is exaggerated. In the field of private law,
if not completely, we can say that it is true as far as it relates
to the family. This happens very few times in relation to the
rights of succession, even though it might be desired to connect
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these with the rights of the family. Still less is this seen in the
realm of property, but the law of obligation and above all the
commercial law could be made uniform with no difficulty for a
large family of civilized peoples, without meeting obstacles in
the national conscience. Before unifying the whole world under
the norm of a common law, the Romans had succeeded in creating a common commercial law, the jus gentium. This practically
fulfilled this function.
The higher value of law is the certainty of the norm, and
the Romans had. begun to unify it by making a unity of vast
agglomerations of men. The form is indifferent. As in nature
different organs fulfil the same function, so the most widely
differing institutions can be used for the same purpose. To use
a common but a very practical example, we may cite vehicles
which play so great a part in modern life. It does not make any
difference whether they keep the right or left side; the important
thing is to have a rule for one side or the other. The ideal will
be a rule common to all sorts of vehicles and for the largest
zone. In the field of obligation, the unity among peoples could
be established in obtaining the same advantage that we have in
weights and measures and that we could have even for money.
The propagation of our civilization in countries which have lived
independent from it, as those of the Far East, has spread also
the principles of the old Roman law, the most important element
which formed the heritage of the ancient world. The general
movement for codification, which took hold of all the continental countries of Europe, and Latin America, in the nineteenth
century, seemed to break the approximate unity of the law which
had been formed in former centuries under the aegis of the
common Roman law, but ended in facilitating its progress and
its enlargement with the Codes. Unnoticed, the Roman law has
given a unity to the language and institutions of the legislation
of civilized peoples and a common direction of thought and discipline of the mind. The compilation of a proposed Code of Obligations, confined as yet to France and Italy, is in progress as the
work of willing French and Italian scholars, under the direction
of the eminent lawyer Vittorio Scialoja. This movement is
followed by every other country of the Entente, and we hope that
even the lawyers who represent the great American people will
Join in these studies and ideas and will collaborate in reconstructing the Latin science of law so that, in course of time, the
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basis of a common commercial law may be laid.
We are at the beginning of a new era for the world. Since
so many human institutions have been overturned by the recent
tempest, one may hope that worshipers of law in all of the most
civilized countries will feel that the time is opportune to cooperate in a common effort to render more agreeable and more
sympathetic the relations among peoples, breaking down at least
many of the artificial barriers, that an evil inheritance of juridical
traditions propagating itself ever like an eternal malady may
have no stable foundation among men.
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